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Abstract—Mobile ad-hoc network is a collection of dynamically 
organized nodes where each node acts as a host and router. 
Mobile ad-hoc networks are characterized by the lack of 
preexisting infrastructures or centralized administration. So, they 
are vulnerable to several types of attacks, especially the Blackhole 
attack. This attack is one of the most serious attacks in this kind 
of mobile networks. In this type of attack, the malicious node 
sends a false answer indicating that it has the shortest path to the 
destination node by increasing the sequence number and 
decreasing the number of hops. This will have a significant 
negative impact on source nodes which send their data packets 
through the malicious node to the destination. This malicious node 
drop received data packets and absorbs all network traffic. In 
order overcome this problem, securing routing protocols become 
a very important requirement in mobile ad-hoc networks. 
Multipath routing protocols are among the protocols affected by 
the Blackhole attack. In this paper, we propose an effective and 
efficient technique that avoids misbehavior of Blackhole nodes 
and facilitates the discovery for the most reliable paths for the 
secure transmission of data packets between communicating 
nodes in the well-known Ad hoc On-demand multi-path routing 
protocol (AOMDV). We implement and simulate our proposed 
technique using the ns 2.35 simulator. We also compared on how 
the three routing protocols AOMDV, AOMDV under Blackhole 
attack (BHAOMDV), and the proposed solution to counter the 
Blackhole attack (IDSAOMDV) performs. The results show the 
degradation on how AOMDV under attack performs, it also 
presents similarities between normal AOMDV and the proposed 
solution by isolating misbehaving node which has resulted in 
increase the performance metrics to the standard values of the 
AOMDV protocol. 
  Index terms—Mobile ad-hoc networks, AOMDV, Blackhole 
attack, Secure routing, Performance evaluation. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
MOBILE ad-hoc network is a set of autonomous mobile 
nodes connected by wireless connections [1]. Without the help 
of an infrastructure or a centralized administration, the nodes 
move freely and form a dynamic topology. In this kind of 
network, the nodes have a wireless interface to communicate  
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with each other where each node can act as a host or a router. 
Communication between nodes is established according to 
certain common rules in the form of a routing protocol which 
allows the discovery, establishment and choice of the route for 
the transmission of data packets between the source and the 
destination through intermediate nodes. However, due to these 
characteristics, mobile ad-hoc networks are exposed to 
different types of attacks and their security is a difficult task 
[2]. In this paper, we focus our study on multi-path routing 
protocols, in particular, the AOMDV routing protocol [3], [4]. 
This protocol can search for multiple paths and choose the 
right route to send data packets. However, this protocol has no 
protection mechanism against any kind of attack. The 
Blackhole attack is one of the most dangerous problems that 
disrupt the communication between nodes within a network. In 
this attack the malicious node announces itself as having 
freshest path to the destination node; it sends a false response 
packet to the source node. So the source node, as soon as it 
receives this false response, it begins the transfer of the data 
packets through the malicious node to the destination node and 
absorbs all by received data packets and all other reply packets 
issued from by other nodes. Blackhole attacks can degrade on 
how the routing protocols in a very serious way performs, by 
falsifying the way of managing communications between 
nodes in ad-hoc network. For that, security of the routing 
becomes a primordial task to fight against this type of attack. 
In this paper, we propose an effective and efficient technique 
to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes, it also, ensure the 
discovery of most reliable and secure paths between 
communicating nodes in AOMDV routing protocol.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present 
the AOMDV routing protocol in the following section. Section 
III deals with the Blackhole attack mechanism. Section IV 
presents the existing mechanisms in literature to detect and 
isolate malicious nodes. Section V details our proposed 
security mechanism, this is followed by a detailed performance 
comparison study and results discussions in Section VI. 
Finally, in Section VII, we conclude our research work and 
present some perspectives. 
 
II. AOMDV (AD-HOC ON DEMAND MULTIPATH DISTANCE 
VECTOR) 
 
AOMDV is a distance vector reactive protocol and 
considered as an enhancement of the well-known AODV
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routing protocol [5], [6]. In the route discovery process, it 
discovers several paths loop-free and link-disjoint, but only 
one path will be considered as primary path and used when 
transmitting data packets; however, the remaining discovered 
paths are considered as alternative paths for the primary path 
when it becomes invalid. If all alternative paths become 
invalid, AOMDV starts a new route discovery process again. 
This protocol provides a set of route update rules to make sure 
that alternative paths are loop-free and link-disjoint. In the 
same way as AODV, AOMDV uses RREQ (Route Request) as 
a route discovery message, RREP (Route Reply) as a route 
response message, RERR (Route Error) as a route error 
message, and a HELLO message for monitoring the state of 
the links between the communicating nodes. In the route 
discovery process, the source node broadcasts the RREQ 
message in the network, so other nodes, either intermediate or 
destination, can accept duplicate RREQs and send multiple 
RREPs to the source node. 
 
III. BLACKHOLE ATTACK 
 
The Blackhole attack is one of the most dangerous problems 
that disrupt the communication between nodes within a 
network [7]. In this attack, a malicious node upon receiving a 
RREQ, it responds immediately and without checking its 
routing table, that it has the shortest path, by announcing a fake 
RREP to the source node. In fact, this RREP has a high 
sequence number and a small hop count. However, other 
responses issued by other nodes arriving later to the source 
node will be ignored by the source node because it assumes 
that the malicious node has the freshest route to the destination 
node and that the route discovery process is complete. Then, 
the source node starts sending data packets to the malicious 
node in which drop them. 
 
IV. RELATED WORK 
 
We present in this section the work related to our study. The 
problem of Blackhole attacks has been studied in several 
research studies. However, some work aims to find and secure 
the routing protocol against a single malicious node; so, other 
works are interested within the problem of several cooperative 
malicious nodes. There have been a number of solutions to 
overcome these security-related. On one hand, proposals that 
deal with the problem of routing security in terms of the 
behavior using control messages (RREP, RRER and RREQ) 
with respect to their contents, such as the number of hops and 
the destination sequence number. On the other hand, studies 
using cryptography for this kind of problem. In the following, 
we look at some related works. The solution proposed in [8] 
by Raj et al., performs an extra check to decide if 
RREP_seq_no is greater than a threshold value. At each time 
interval, the threshold value is dynamically updated. If the 
value of RREP_seq_no is greater than the threshold value, the 
node is suspected of being malicious and will be added to the 
blacklist. Thus, sending an ALARM control packet to its 
neighbors so that the RREPs coming from the malicious node 
will be ignored. The threshold value is the average of the 
difference in each time interval between the sequence number 
of the routing table and the sequence number in the RREP 
packet. The threshold value is updated each time a new node 
receives an RREP packet. This solution increases the Packet 
Delivery Ratio (PDR) with a minimum increase in the average 
end-to-end delay and normalized routing overhead. The main 
advantage of this technique is that the source node proclaims 
the malicious node to its neighbor’s nodes to be ignored, but 
this method can also make mistakes when not malicious node 
may be entered into the blocked list according to its higher 
sequence number. On the other hand, this method can detect 
and drop simple and multiple Blackhole attacks, but it will be 
too complex for cooperative Blackhole attacks. Moreover, the 
routing overhead is considerably increased due to the updating 
of the threshold every time along with the forwarding of the 
ALARM control packet. To isolate malicious nodes and 
protect normal nodes from Blackhole attacks in the network, 
N. Mistry, et al. [9] proposed an improvement to the AODV 
protocol against Blackhole attacks. The advantage of this 
solution lies in the use of an extra function Pre_ReceiveReply 
(Packet P), the addition of a new table Cmg_RREP_Tab, a 
timer MOS_WAIT_TIME, and a variable (Mali_node) to the 
data structures in the AODV routing protocol. In the 
Pre_ReceiveReply (Packet P) function it keeps all the RREPs 
in the Cmg_RREP_Tab until time of MO_WAIT_TIME. The 
MOS_WAIT_TIME is initialized by half of the 
RREP_WAIT_TIME (during where the source node waits for 
the RREP) before regenerating the RREQ. However, the 
source node after receiving the first RREP waits for 
MOS_WAIT_TIME and during which it will save all future 
RREPs in the Cmg_RREP_Tab. Subsequently, the source node 
analyzes all the RREPs stored in the Cmg_RREP_Tab and 
ignores the RREP of the node whose destination sequence 
number is probably very high (this node is suspected to be 
malicious) and maintains identity of the malicious node, hence 
to ignore all the RREPs coming from this node in the future. 
Then, the selection of RREP with the highest destination 
sequence number in the Cmg_RREP_Tab that will be used in 
the recvReply (Packet P) function of the AODV to be used to 
send data packets. Additionally, to keep up the freshness of the 
Cmg_RREP_Tab, it is emptied as soon as an RREP is chosen. 
However, this solution does not add any control message to the 
AODV. The chance of increasing the normalized routing 
overhead is minimal. The PDR is increased with an acceptable 
end-to-end-delay. So, this solution can be used to detect and 
avoid simple and multiple Blackhole attacks, but introduces an 
increase in memory due to the use of Cmg_RREP_Tab. 
Mahmoud et al. [10] proposed a modified AODV routing 
protocol to avoid Blackhole attack in MANETs. Proposed 
Intrusion Avoidance System (IASAODV) detects and avoids 
the Blackhole nodes in two stages. The first step is based on 
counting RREQ and RREP control messages during route 
discovery. The second step is based on the Destination 
Sequence Number (DSN) of the RREP message, the number of 
RREP messages computed in the first step and the arrival time 
of RREP at the source. However, in the first step, a Route 
Reply Table is created to store all RREP messages from the 
destination node. The time to wait before data sending is 
considered twice the value of RREP_WAIT_TIME. As soon 
as the RREP_WAIT_TIME timer expires, the number of 
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RREP messages in the Route Reply Table (RRT) is checked in 
the second step. The existence of more than one RREP 
message in the RRT table signifies a Blackhole attack threat. 
In the case of receiving only one RREP message, the 
destination node is considered a trusted node and all data will 
be sent to it. The results obtained with this mechanism give 
better values for PDR, Throughput and Normalized Routing 
Load (NRL). This solution can detect and avoid simple and 
multiple Blackhole attacks, but introduces an increase in wait 
time and memory due to the doubled waiting of 
RREP_WAIT_TIME and the use of RRT. AOMDV routing 
protocol has also captured the interest of researchers in the 
field of detection and avoidance of Blackhole nodes. In [11], 
the authors proposed a detection mechanism for AOMDV. The 
proposed method is to send data packets across all possible 
routes after sending a random number of packets. In this 
solution, the destination node is modified to receive and 
compare the packets. If a malicious node causes an attack, the 
destination will know it because the data packet will not be 
received by it from the active route, and then send FINISH 
packet by another route to the source node. 
 






















The source node after receiving FINISH packet, it stops 
sending data through the current route by purging the current 
entry from the routing table and  starts sending packets through 
another route present in the routing table. This procedure will 
be repeated after sending data packets that are exponentially 
larger than the previous one until the entire transmission has 
been completed. This mechanism uses a counter that will be 
exponentially increased and it is possible to reduce the 
overhead of sending packets across all routes. The proposed 
approach has a negligible false detection ratio and can detect 
single, multiple and cooperative Blackhole attacks. It does not 
even require any extra memory and has nominal routing 
overhead. An Elliptic Curve Cryptography Based Data 
Transmission against Blackhole Attack in MANET mechanism 
was proposed by Sultana et al. [12]. In their solution, they 
implemented Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with the 
AOMDV routing protocol. In ECC, a public key cryptography 
mechanism that runs on a discrete logarithm problem with a 
smaller key size was used to encrypt the data packets to the 
source node before transmission. They have created a secure 
agent that generates the encrypted packet, then this packet 
reaches the destination by one of the selected multiple paths. 
In fact, the source node generates a private/public key pair. In 
the beginning, the source node chooses a random private key 
and generates a secret key from its own private key and the 
recipients public key. It encrypts the packet with the newly 
generated secret key and announces the public key. After that, 
























Upon receiving the encrypted packet by the destination node, it 
generates the same secret key using its own private key and the 
new public key of the source node. The destination node can 
decrypt the packet using its shared secret key and its 
private/public key pair to get the original data. In this case, it 
will be difficult for the malicious node to extract the private 
key from a secret key and the public key. The proposed 
mechanism ensures authentication and confidentiality for 
Comparison Metric Limitations of Existing Approaches 
Detection of different 
types of Blackhole 
attacks 
Proposed approaches [8], [9], [10], and [11] can detect and avoid single and multiple Blackhole attacks. Moreover, proposed 
approach [11] can detect cooperative Blackhole attacks, but it will be too complex for proposed approach [8] to detect 
cooperative Blackhole attacks. 
Increase/decrease in 
performance metrics 
In [10], the average end-to-end delay of the AODV protocol is less than the proposed IASAODV protocol due to the doubled 
waiting time. In [12], the packet delivery ratio is definitely highest with no malicious node in the environment. It decreases 
slowly with increasing number of malicious nodes. The average end-to-end delay increases gradually with incremented 
malicious nodes as time is taken by the encryption process with ECC. In [13], the end-to-end delay is higher in proposed 
scheme than the original AOMDV scheme when the number of malicious nodes is increased as time is taken by the splitting 
and encrypting of messages. The impact is present with higher data loss in the proposed scheme by increasing the malicious 
nodes. In [14], the packet delivery ratio stays holding the same amount (100%) in proposed scheme in the presence of any 
malicious nodes. The proposed scheme takes more time for delivering the packet, the throughput is higher in proposed 
scheme compared to the original scheme for the packet transmission. There is impact of multiple attackers in the proposed 
protocol because the scheme utilizes multiple paths simultaneously. The impact is present with higher data loss in proposed 
scheme by increasing the malicious nodes. The delay is higher for proposed scheme than the original AOMDV scheme when 
the number of malicious nodes is increased due to its procedures and security features.  
Requirement of extra 
memory/database 
Proposed approach [9] introduces an increase in memory due to the use of Cmg_RREP_Tab. Proposed approach [10] 
introduces an increase in wait time and memory due to the doubled waiting of RREP_WAIT_TIME and the use of Route 
Reply Table (RRT). Proposed approach [11] does not even require any extra memory. 
Burden on intermediate 
nodes 
In [11], no involvement of intermediate nodes is required for the proper functioning of the scheme thus preventing an extra 
burden on mobile intermediate nodes. Only sender and destination node is responsible for the proper functioning of approach. 
But, in [8], an extra burden on the energy of mobile nodes, due to the transmitted of ALARM messages to neighbors nodes. 
Also, in [13], and [14], every message is split into many parts, then the energy usage may increase because of the increased 
total size of the transmitted messages. 
False detection ratio 
False detection ratio of the proposed approach [8] is high, but it is negligible in the proposed approach [11] as it does not 
work on supposition. 
Communication/routing 
overhead 
In [8], the routing overhead is considerably increased due to the updating of the threshold every time interval along with the 
forwarding of the ALARM control packet. In [11], nominal communication overhead is present as the scheme does not 
involve additional control packets except the one which is sent only once. In [12], the normalized routing load grows with the 
number of Blackhole attacker nodes present in the situation, though the normalized routing load may vary depending on the 
number of packet transmission. 
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secure data transmission. However, the main advantage with 
the use of ECC is, it takes less memory provides great security. 
So, this mechanism achieved a high-level of security. One of 
the challenges for this solution is the management and 
distribution of the keys as mobile nodes do not have a 
centralized administration. Authors in [13] proposed Secure 
and reliable data forwarding using homomorphic encryption 
against blackhole attacks in mobile ad hoc networks, in which 
there modified the earlier version [14] titled Securing Data 
Forwarding against Blackhole Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks. They extended AOMDV scheme to make data 
transmission be reliable and secure in the presence of 
malicious nodes in MANETs by distributing the parts of entire 
message into multiple paths and using a homomorphic 
encryption method for cryptography. The idea of this scheme 
is to assign a set of disjoint paths into a set of groups and 
several active disjoint paths are assigned to each group, where 
all disjoint paths are connected between a sender and a 
receiver. They split a message into many parts before the 
message is transmitted, and encrypt each part based on 
homomorphic encryption method. Then, the part of the 
message is transmitted to each group in order that only one 
encrypted part of the message is able to reach each group. 
Every node in each group can receive the same part of the 
message. Then, even if an intermediate node is misbehaving 
(dropping the part), the part of the message can be delivered to 
the destination through another path. Thus, the receiver is able 
to receive the whole encrypted parts of the message, decrypt 
the whole parts, combine them, and recover the whole 
message. The simulation results show that the proposed 
scheme provides a higher packet delivery ratio and throughput, 
which are good features for the emergency applications in 
MANETs. Moreover, the success rate of the proposed scheme 
to ensure and guarantee the delivery of the packet to the target 
is very high with many active paths in each group of the 
network. This scheme achieved a high level of security. One of 
the drawbacks for this solution is the increasing of the end-to-
end delay due to the splitting and encrypting of messages. 
Table I shows limitations of existing approaches.   
 
V. PROPOSED MECHANISM 
 
A. Working Principle of the Proposed Mechanism  
 
The main goal of our IDSAOMDV is to detect, isolate and 
eliminate attacks from many malicious nodes. In the AOMDV, 
during the route discovery process, several paths can be 
discovered in order to choose one as main path for data 
packets transmission to the destination node. However, the 
selection criteria for this path is based on the sequence number 
and the hop count in order to get the shortest and freshest path. 
This criterion leads to threats that are used in Blackhole 
attacks. To overcome this problem, we have created a new 
function that returns two values, the first value (sum) is the 
sum of differences between the sequence number in the RREQ 
and the RREP packets and the second one (nrep) which is the 
number of received RREP packets. This function will be called 
from the standard recvRepp (p) function of the AOMDV 
protocol. The two values sum and nrep allow computing a 
threshold (TH) as a barrier against the sequence numbers 
announced by the Blackhole attackers and will secure the 
process of selecting main routes to transmit data packets. We 
recall that AOMDV protocol can choose a main path among 
several paths after checking the criterion: if (rt -> rt_seqno < 
rp-> rp_dst_seqno). However, in our technique, we changed 
this criteria as: if ((TH> rp -> rp_dst_seqno) && (rt -> 
rt_seqno< rp -> rp_dst_seqno)). This condition only allows 
keeping routes with a destination sequence number value lower 
than TH and at the same time higher than the sequence number 
defined in the routing table. However, the routing protocol 
might choose the appropriate route for data transmission. 
Thus, the other sequence number values will never be 
considered by the source node to avoid malicious nodes. So, 
this idea will allow finding secure routes and isolating 
Blackhole nodes from the network. A new additional table 
named ADDTABLE to store the RREP responses, and 
methods dealing with it, are implemented. The first function 
named (allrrep (p)) which records the RREPs in the 
ADDTABLE and it is called by the second function (prerrep 
(p)) which returns sum and nrep in order to compute the TH. 
The function (prerrep (p)) is called in the recvReply (p) 
function before the source node chooses the forwarding route. 




Fig. 1. Flowchart of the proposed mechanism 
 
B. Proposed Algorithm 
 
The following notations are used to express the proposed 
algorithm: SN: Source Node; DN: Destination Node; RREQ: 
Route Request; RREP: Route Reply; TH: Threshold; dif: 
Difference between sequence number of RREP and of RREQ; 
sum: Summation of dif; nrep: Replies number. The proposed 
detection and prevention algorithm are as follows: 
 
Start the Route discovery process with SN and DN by using RREQ 
and RREP packets;  
Store all RREP packets in ADDTABLE; 
while ADDTABLE is not emty do 
if rp- > rp_dst_seqno > rq- > rq_src_seqno     
then 
dif = ((rp- > rp_dst_seqno) - (rq- > 
rq_src_seqno)); 
sum= sum + dif; 
nrep++ ; 
end 
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end 
TH=sum/nrep ; 
For all RREP responses; 
if (TH > rp-> rp_dst_seqno) && (rt-> rt_seqno < rp-> rp_dst_seqno) 
then 
Legitimate node detection ; 
Continue with normal routing process; 
else 
Malicious node detection ; 
Discard RREP; 
end 
Algorithm 1: Algorithm describing the detection and prevention 
mechanism 
 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RESULT DISCUSSIONS  
 
To evaluate the performance of our mechanism, we have 
performed a detailed simulation study under the well known ns 
2.35 simulator. We implemented three protocols AOMDV, 
BHAOMDV under Blackhole attacks, and our proposed 
solution IDSAOMDV. 
 
A. Simulation Parameters 
 
We use a random pattern of node mobility, where each node 
randomly moves in an area of 1500m_300m. The simulation 
time is 900 seconds, the pause time varied as (0s, 30s, 60s, 
120s, 300s, 600s, 900s), the communicating nodes number 
varied as (10, 20, 30, 40) on 50 nodes of the network with 4 
packets/second. The most speed is 20 m/s, the packet size is 
512 bytes. The attacking nodes number varied from 1 to 5. We 
studied four scenarios, and the Gnuplot version 5.2 represents 
graphs. Table II shows the main simulation parameters. 
 
TABLE II. SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 
Parameter Value 
Simulation area (m × m) 1500 × 300 
Number of nodes 50 
Simulation time (s) 900 
Mobility Model Random way point 
Maximum speed (m/s) 20 
Pause time (s) 0, 30, 60, 120, 300, 600, 900 
Number of communicating nodes 10, 30, 30, 40 
Application layer Constant Bit Rate (CBR) 
Packet size 512 bytes 




Number of Blackhole nodes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
 
B. Performance Metrics 
 
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) : Represents the ratio of the 
packets received number by the destination node to the 
packets sent number by the source node; 
• Average End to End Delay (AEED): Represents the 
average end-to-end delay of sending packets by the source 
• and receiving it by the destination; 
• Drop packets (DP): Represents the packets lost number 
during the simulation; 
• Forwarded packets (FP): Represents the packets 
transmitted number during the simulation. 
 
C. Simulation Results 
 
1) Packet Delivery Ratio: Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 and tables 
IV, V, VI and VII respectively present the PDR evolution for 
the AOMDV, BHAOMDV, and IDSAOMDV with variation 
of the communicating nodes from 10 to 40 nodes, variation of 
the pause time from 0 to 900 seconds, and variation of the 
malicious nodes number from 1 to 5. In the first scenario 
where the communicating nodes number is 10 and with 
presence of a single malicious node, the PDR varied from 
98.72% to 99.99% for AOMDV and from 61.57% to 96.56% 
for BHAOMDV. Thus, degradation of PDR in BHAOMDV 
varied from 3.16% to 37.39% when compared with the 
AOMDV. The AOMDV and IDSAOMDV have almost the 
same value of the PDR. Subsequently, performance of 
BHAOMDV is progressively degraded according to variation 
of the malicious nodes number. However, other scenarios 
behave the same way. Therefore, the four scenarios show 
performance degradation of the BHAOMDV and show also 
that the proposed IDSAOMDV gives similar results as the 
AOMDV, which denotes that our proposed mechanism detect 













Fig. 4. Packet Delivery Ratio for 30 communicating Nodes 
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Fig. 5. Packet Delivery Ratio for 40 communicating Nodes 
 
2) Average End to End Delay: We have also studied the 
end-to-end delay between source and destination nodes. The 
following graphs illustrated in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 and tables 
VIII, IX, X and XI respectively show performance of 
AOMDV, BHAOMDV, and IDSAOMDV in terms of end-to-
end delay. Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 depict clearly that AOMDV 
and IDSAOMDV give less end-to-end delay without and with 
Blackhole attacks. With presence of a single malicious node, 
and with 10 communicating nodes, the average end-to-end 
delay reaches up to 0.0011ms for AOMDV, 0.0011ms for 
IDSAOMDV and 0.0095ms for BHAOMDV. In this case, 
almost all the graphs are similar, with the exception for the 
pause time 0, where there is a variation in the value of the 
average end-to-end delay due to instability of the nodes in the 
communication at that time. But in scenarios where the nodes 








Fig. 7. Average End to End Delay for 20 communicating Nodes 
 
end-to-end delay increases progressively according to  
variation of the nodes number in communication and  
simultaneously of variation of the malicious nodes number for 
BHAOMDV. As a result, the average end-to-end delay 
performance metric values are large and unstable for 
BHAOMDV. However, these values are very close and low for 









Fig. 9. Average End to End Delay for 40 communicating Nodes 
 
3) Dropped Packets: Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 and tables 
XII, XIII, XIV and XV respectively illustrate the lost packets 




Fig. 10. Dropped Packets for 10 communicating Nodes 
 
results show that IDSAOMDV based on our technique has 
fewer lost packets than in BHAOMDV, because malicious 
nodes have been identified and avoided in our solution, which 
reduces the lost packets number. According to Fig. 10, the lost 
packets number for AOMDV is 2 to 432, so the technique 




Fig. 11. Dropped Packets for 20 communicating Nodes 
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Fig. 13. Dropped Packets for 40 communicating Nodes 
 
node generates results as 3 to 425 lost packets for  
IDSAOMDV, on the other hand in BHAOMDV with the 
presence of a single malicious node causes 1168 to 13082 lost 
packets. Thus, the lost packets number is greater in 
BHAOMDV when compared with AOMDV or IDSAOMDV. 
In the same figure (Fig. 10), and when there is an increase in 
the malicious nodes number, the lost packets number increases 
in BHAOMDV. We notice that the results behave in the same 
way as for 10 communicating nodes by varying the 
communicating nodes number from 20 to 40 nodes (Figures 
11, 12, and 13), also, the increase in the communicating nodes 
number causes the progressive increase in lost packets for 
BHAOMDV. Moreover, this is an indication of better 
performance guarantees when the use of our proposed 
technique. 
 
4) Forwarded Packets: In Figures 14, 15, 16, and 17 and 
tables XVI, XVII, XVIII and XIX respectively, we have 
illustrated the transmitted packets number in the case of 
AOMDV, BHAOMDV, and IDSAOMDV. In AOMDV, the 
chance of transmitting data packets increases in the presence of 
alternative paths in the network if the first path fails. In 
BHAOMDV, presence of malicious nodes in the network 
causes the loss of packets due to the malicious nodes 
misbehavior, thus the transmitted packets number is lower than 
in AOMDV. Applying our technique in IDSAOMDV, the 
transmitted packets number is greater than in BHAOMDV 
because our technique avoids malicious nodes to build the data 
packet transmission paths. In the case of Fig. 14, the 
transmitted packets number is 2847 to 10011 for AOMDV, 
1420 to 10576 for BHAOMDV with presence of a single 
malicious node, and 2956 to 9967 for IDSAOMDV with the 
presence of a single malicious node. Thus, the transmitted 
packets number represents 94.35% to 157.68% more for 
AOMDV than for BHAOMDV. As the malicious nodes 
number increases, the transmitted packets number is much 
reduced for BHAOMDV. The transmitted packets number in 
the case of IDSAOMDV is very large compared to 
BHAOMDV. This shows that the transmitted packets number 
from the source to the destination has increased for 
IDSAOMDV, the reason is that if a malicious node presents 
itself in the network it causes the loss of packets in the case of 
BHAOMDV, but we apply our technique in IDSAOMDV, the 
malicious node is avoided before the protocol establishes the 
data packet transmission paths which maintains the paths 
reliability built from the source node to the destination node 
and improves the transmitted packets number. The results 
presented in Figures 15, 16, and 17 behave in the same way as 
for 10 communicating nodes, moreover, the increase in the 
communicating nodes number causes the progressive increase 
of the transmitted packets for AOMDV, BHAOMDV, and 
IDSAOMDV, that alternative paths can be used, also, more 
malicious nodes number is least, more transmitted packets is 
larger for BHAOMDV. The results obtained prove the 




Fig. 14. Forwarded Packets for 10 communicating Nodes 
 
D. Comparison with Others Solutions 
 
In this section, we compare the performance of our 
proposed solution against others solutions described in Section 
IV ([11], [12] and [13]) that has similarities with the proposed  
solution. In [11], when their proposed approach is 
implemented then despite the presence of malicious nodes the 
Packet Delivery Ratio improved significantly and it roses to 
94% when three malicious nodes were present and with an 
average growth of above 60%. In [12], the Packet Delivery 
Ratio is definitely highest with no malicious node in the 
environment, it reach 99.86%. It decreases slowly with 
increasing number of malicious nodes, it is 32% for one 
malicious node and it is 6% for three malicious nodes. In [13], 
the Packet Delivery Ratio is close to more than 70% for a 
single malicious node, and it is not less than 45% for 5 
malicious nodes, but it is close to 90% without malicious 
nodes. In our solution as shown in the Section VI, in all 
scenarios the PDR for IDSAOMDV is not less than 98%. In 
[12], the average end-to-end delay increases gradually with 
incremented malicious nodes as time is taken by the encryption 
process with ECC. The Average end-to-end delay is 
85655.8ms in the presence of a single malicious node, and is 
85658.6ms in the presence of 3 malicious nodes, but it is 
85652.4ms without malicious node. In [13], the end-to-end 
delay is higher in this scheme than the original AOMDV  
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Fig. 17. Forwarded Packets for 40 communicating Nodes 
 
scheme when the number of malicious nodes is increased due  
to its procedures and security features. In this solution, the 
message is divided and encrypted to achieve their feature. Due 
to this reason, it takes more delay for the delivery. In our 
solution as shown in the Section VI, in all scenarios the values 
of end to end delay are very close for IDSAOMDV when 
compared with AOMDV.  In [13], there is an impact of  
 
 
multiple attackers because the scheme utilizes multiple paths 
simultaneously. Even though the impact is present with higher 
data loss in this scheme by increasing the malicious nodes, it 
delivers almost whole packet to the destination by distributing 
it into multiple paths to ensure the entire delivery through safe 
paths. In our solution as shown in the Section VI, in all 
scenarios the values of dropped packets are very close for 
IDSAOMDV when compared with AOMDV.  
In summary, the comparison covers most scenarios like 
packet delivery ratio, average end-to-end delay, and dropped 
packets in the presence of Blackhole attacks. Based on the 
above performance comparisons, the proposed solution is very 
effective in most of the scenarios we tested. Table III 
summarizes the comparison of the proposed secure routing 




Mobile ad-hoc networks suffer from several types of attacks, 
in particular, the Blackhole attack. It is an attack where the 
malicious node can falsify the protocol response message to 
pretending it has the shortest path to reach the destination 
node. The mechanisms presented in the AOMDV routing 
protocol do not consider security. However, we have proposed 
an enhancement of the AOMDV to detect and isolate 
Blackhole attacks. In this paper, we have surveyed Blackhole 
attacks to prove our technique against this attack. In order to 
analyze its impacts on the AOMDV, we implemented 
BHAOMDV with several Blackhole attacks, and to detect and 
isolate malicious nodes, we have also implemented 
IDSAOMDV as a solution against Blackhole attacks. Our 
proposed technique works well even when multiple malicious 
nodes attack. The results show that the performances of the 
two protocols AOMDV and IDSAOMDV are almost equal. 
The results also prove the impact of Blackhole attacks on how 
the AOMDV performs and shows the validity of our proposed 



































TABLE III. COMPARISON OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
 
Approaches Advantages Disadvantages 
Our 
approach 
-Simple -No energy consumption problem -The comparison operation of 
destination sequence number with a threshold value on the route reply does not 
increase the communication delay. -The comparative performance evaluations 
prove that, by detecting and discarding the Blackhole nodes in the network, the 
delivery ratio increases without causing too much extra delay. 
Unable to detect the malicious node if it does not use 
high destination sequence number.  
-Storage area problem due to the additional table. 
[13] 
-The security is high due to the uses of encryption/decryption algorithms. 
-The proposed method increases the delivery ratio and throughput. 
-Complex -Energy consumption problem -Storage area 
and computation power problem -Adds a significant 
computational burden due to homomorphic encryption 
method. -The splitting and combining operation 
increases total end-to-end delay in the network. 
[14] 
-The security is high due to the uses of encryption/decryption algorithms. –All 
transmitted data packets are successfully received by the destination nodes. The 
delivery ratio is 100%. -The proposed method increases the throughput. 
-Complex -Energy consumption problem -Storage area 
and computation power problem -Adds a significant 
computational burden due to homomorphic encryption 
method. -The splitting and combining operation 
increases total end-to-end delay in the network. 
 



























































































































Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR (%)) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 98.7285 74.6420 57.9616 60.5142 52.1060 54.3088 98.7563 98.6568 98.8950 98.6955 98.7382 
30 98.9663 61.5744 47.0143 45.7525 38.5168 42.1662 98.9963 98.9359 99.1580 99.0896 98.7821 
60 99.7350 96.5652 93.7301 93.8090 90.8596 81.1919 99.7379 99.6936 99.7447 99.7325 99.7769 
120 99.7527 93.4371 85.9151 85.9777 73.2925 79.2274 99.6908 99.7419 99.6619 99.7269 99.7500 
300 99.7148 95.2363 95.2231 95.2573 92.9374 84.7543 99.7389 99.6976 99.5559 99.6943 99.6330 
600 99.8826 96.1559 92.2154 78.4048 95.0264 83.0457 99.9442 99.9499 99.8971 99.9558 99.8704 
900 99.9941 91.1590 80.8108 80.8888 70.6140 80.8679 99.9912 100 99.9971 99.9941 99.9971 
 




Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR (%)) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 98.8685 72.2105 66.0498 53.5555 61.4748 51.3834 98.9638 98.6953 98.7645 98.6928 98.8404 
30 99.1385 77.7305 62.5638 63.8773 52.1095 47.5653 98.9214 99.2389 99.1209 99.1159 99.1095 
60 99.3418 91.4575 87.9499 86.9325 85.8259 80.5110 99.4618 99.5047 99.4069 99.4391 99.3976 
120 99.4297 93.5923 86.6752 75.6910 74.5705 75.9640 99.4689 99.3828 99.4249 99.3572 99.4611 
300 99.5957 86.7648 91.2945 83.5935 89.2323 76.0011 99.5057 99.6869 99.6353 99.5137 99.6926 
600 99.6995 84.5319 83.2606 77.4847 81.1189 69.9493 99.7442 99.7546 99.6812 99.8303 99.7485 
900 99.9955 95.4349 90.1659 90.2322 90.1652 90.1162 99.9955 99.9940 99.9895 99.9985 99.9985 
 




Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR (%)) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 99.0342 85.8032 74.8684 65.1513 63.4571 60.7235 99.1722 99.1917 99.1517 99.2423 99.0975 
30 99.0878 76.4332 69.9047 63.7419 61.7247 60.8521 99.2336 99.2909 99.1398 99.1607 99.3015 
60 99.2751 78.8718 79.3859 71.4968 67.7134 69.7698 99.2895 99.1473 99.1919 99.2190 99.2275 
120 99.4735 94.9053 83.0678 82.7474 78.4579 74.9933 99.4985 99.4238 99.3926 99.4180 99.4619 
300 99.6004 86.5031 87.8994 85.4669 85.3845 80.8191 99.7491 99.7214 99.6767 99.6894 99.6950 
600 99.7392 83.9823 83.1621 74.1155 76.1286 72.6129 99.7683 99.7699 99.7507 99.8017 99.7574 
900 99.9249 95.1220 90.0894 85.3920 84.9894 80.3074 99.9724 99.9240 99.9746 99.9309 99.9532 
 




Average End to End Delay (ms) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 0.000963 0.009554 0.021496 0.011568 0.013290 0.000920 0.000965 0.007438 0.007944 0.000970 0.013370 
30 0.000964 0.000938 0.001035 0.000963 0.008872 0.000941 0.000986 0.000992 0.000972 0.001001 0.001025 
60 0.000947 0.000950 0.000953 0.000953 0.000938 0.000905 0.000944 0.000920 0.000920 0.000951 0.000947 
120 0.000938 0.001682 0.000914 0.001740 0.001839 0.000897 0.000932 0.000939 0.000933 0.000940 0.000939 
300 0.000969 0.000937 0.000931 0.000930 0.000900 0.000889 0.000968 0.000968 0.000972 0.000970 0.000970 
600 0.000993 0.001007 0.000945 0.000920 0.001027 0.000938 0.000999 0.000995 0.000995 0.001057 0.000995 
900 0.001143 0.001185 0.000967 0.000974 0.000987 0.000969 0.001141 0.001250 0.001144 0.001243 0.001241 
 




Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR (%)) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 98.9558 85.0916 69.0720 56.9383 54.1597 56.5517 98.9936 98.9488 99.0288 98.9395 98.8569 
30 99.1609 72.3800 64.6430 59.7985 55.4230 59.2101 99.0908 99.1885 99.1296 99.0980 99.2489 
60 99.3752 90.0502 85.0218 83.9756 78.6148 79.6274 99.3467 99.4405 99.3035 99.4419 99.2091 
120 99.5451 94.4363 89.3220 88.1569 82.9505 83.7378 99.4209 99.4565 99.4275 99.4482 99.5369 
300 99.6941 93.3526 90.7633 90.6468 95.2586 82.8969 99.6847 99.7696 99.6626 99.7032 99.6024 
600 99.7740 85.5735 85.2830 74.5554 75.1229 72.4488 99.6920 99.7531 99.7982 99.7891 99.7311 
900 99.9737 96.9495 93.3827 90.2777 89.8830 86.8266 99.9778 99.9727 99.9879 99.9586 99.9838 
 



























































































































Average End to End Delay (ms) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 0.001025 0.012254 0.007292 0.006298 0.002950 0.000942 0.011245 0.008845 0.001048 0.001026 0.011316 
30 0.001011 0.000974 0.000981 0.017858 0.000983 0.000911 0.001029 0.001006 0.001012 0.002325 0.001018 
60 0.001018 0.000997 0.001005 0.000999 0.002068 0.004572 0.001018 0.000994 0.001027 0.001047 0.001018 
120 0.001055 0.001446 0.001040 0.001466 0.012301 0.000975 0.001086 0.001064 0.001047 0.001081 0.001053 
300 0.001079 0.000995 0.001030 0.000985 0.001034 0.001943 0.001092 0.001074 0.001109 0.001097 0.001092 
600 0.001119 0.011663 0.001026 0.001035 0.001022 0.012491 0.001121 0.001119 0.001155 0.001183 0.001152 
900 0.001039 0.001057 0.000933 0.000936 0.000996 0.000937 0.001035 0.001091 0.001043 0.001033 0.001040 
 




Average End to End Delay (ms) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 0,001072 0,003679 0,002597 0,003026 0,001085 0,005931 0,001075 0,005453 0,001062 0,019249 0,004846 
30 0,001069 0,004448 0,008870 0,002410 0,001247 0,005707 0,002150 0,001063 0,001049 0,001063 0,001061 
60 0,001070 0,001097 0,003983 0,011829 0,007575 0,001029 0,001063 0,001073 0,001062 0,001063 0,001076 
120 0,001089 0,003145 0,001052 0,001318 0,001849 0,001022 0,001114 0,001086 0,001080 0,001098 0,001089 
300 0,001073 0,001006 0,001004 0,000989 0,001021 0,002756 0,001061 0,001053 0,001070 0,001071 0,001075 
600 0,001195 0,001089 0,001083 0,000984 0,000983 0,012601 0,001226 0,001169 0,001174 0,001196 0,001194 
900 0,001145 0,001144 0,001062 0,001029 0,001073 0,000991 0,001142 0,001190 0,001140 0,001176 0,001140 
 




Average End to End Delay (ms) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 0,005044 0,003027 0,012910 0,003165 0,003721 0,005041 0,001081 0,001835 0,001066 0,001057 0,005075 
30 0,001107 0,001029 0,001026 0,002048 0,001198 0,002490 0,001928 0,001125 0,001120 0,001130 0,001120 
60 0,001134 0,001122 0,001123 0,001785 0,007806 0,002229 0,001160 0,001115 0,002558 0,001152 0,001156 
120 0,001156 0,001361 0,001104 0,001326 0,001508 0,003797 0,001169 0,001160 0,001162 0,001151 0,001155 
300 0,001185 0,001056 0,001394 0,001051 0,001044 0,001362 0,001155 0,001169 0,001200 0,001168 0,001156 
600 0,001260 0,007405 0,010854 0,006489 0,015920 0,001204 0,001317 0,001266 0,001266 0,001289 0,001267 
900 0,001348 0,001253 0,001145 0,001088 0,001438 0,001058 0,001322 0,001389 0,001307 0,001425 0,001315 
 




Dropped Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 754 18444 22531 30870 25586 32314 690 870 820 875 772 
30 574 14804 24871 23999 31830 34803 720 506 585 591 594 
60 439 5666 8003 8676 9419 12915 361 329 396 376 402 
120 383 4261 8865 16158 16904 15985 355 410 383 428 359 
300 269 8794 5785 10910 7153 15935 328 208 242 324 204 
600 200 10281 11129 14981 12546 19966 172 162 213 114 167 
900 3 3032 6539 6491 6532 6576 3 4 8 1 1 
 




Dropped Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 432 8624 14304 13424 16283 15515 425 459 376 444 429 
30 353 13082 18049 18438 20884 19672 343 366 289 311 418 
60 90 1168 2131 2111 3109 6397 89 105 87 91 77 
120 86 2232 4800 4784 9080 7071 105 88 115 93 85 
300 98 1619 1627 1610 2402 5193 89 103 152 104 126 
600 40 1308 2648 7340 1689 5767 19 17 35 15 44 
900 2 3013 6527 6502 9992 6503 3 0 1 2 1 
 



























































































































Dropped Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1262 18531 32749 45439 47621 51213 1087 1057 1113 993 1178 
30 1194 30739 39282 47287 49916 51020 1004 934 1127 1097 916 
60 958 27541 26867 37146 42086 39396 930 1114 1072 1024 1024 
120 689 6651 22078 22493 28111 32584 657 752 793 762 706 
300 526 17589 15776 18961 19071 25019 328 363 422 408 400 
600 343 20909 21966 33731 31116 35713 302 304 327 260 319 
900 101 6360 12931 19050 19555 25687 36 103 34 93 61 
 




Forwarded Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 2847 2294 1103 1353 629 588 3169 3229 3173 3202 3087 
30 3356 1420 1965 4676 3704 796 4022 4227 3696 4352 5124 
60 3284 3172 3153 3171 2728 1607 3315 2370 2337 3355 3298 
120 3010 2695 1967 1968 901 1225 2956 2999 2826 3010 3005 
300 4065 2729 2725 2696 2499 1219 4116 4106 4048 4082 4030 
600 4860 5123 2784 311 5351 2428 4909 4892 4908 4876 4861 
900 10011 10576 3472 3528 3589 3505 9967 13646 9998 13448 13472 
 




Dropped Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1035 14741 30652 42612 45299 42975 995 1047 969 1058 1135 
30 835 27341 35041 39819 44129 40352 903 805 863 895 746 
60 618 9851 14816 15844 21173 20158 650 555 694 559 784 
120 454 5509 10566 11725 16857 16092 576 539 570 552 458 
300 303 6590 9133 9250 4700 16931 314 228 335 294 395 
600 225 14275 14575 25193 24602 27259 305 247 200 209 266 
900 25 3020 6535 9630 10017 13021 22 27 13 42 13 
 




Forwarded Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 10448 9435 7217 5344 7971 4327 10404 10468 10134 10203 10086 
30 11222 5641 5454 6062 2948 4937 11334 10694 9832 10616 10397 
60 12172 9698 8541 11183 5018 5548 11657 11801 10691 11352 12003 
120 11911 11921 8885 8112 6818 4966 12773 11651 11837 12573 11926 
300 11352 6203 7365 4573 7655 867 10877 10676 11575 11550 11466 
600 22321 12395 13308 3354 4673 3523 23167 20260 20277 20341 22195 
900 16510 17013 9932 6935 10143 3470 16554 20106 16506 16511 16523 
 




Forwarded Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 6856 4664 4680 4036 2977 772 7567 6751 7717 7146 7416 
30 7208 4611 4967 5146 2167 671 8281 6782 7408 6781 7240 
60 7736 6566 5729 6393 4740 4374 8072 6268 7985 8939 7789 
120 9542 9806 7327 4735 2975 4377 10899 10135 9179 10288 9271 
300 11505 7647 8054 4817 8236 1450 11757 11500 13370 12282 11506 
600 14201 9511 7591 6129 8729 1393 14229 14118 16166 16168 16092 
900 10009 10615 3479 3481 7049 3522 10023 13581 9998 9989 10026 
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Forwarded Packets (packet) 
AOMDV 
BHAOMDV IDSAOMDV 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 10293 9646 4392 4972 3294 1321 11122 11050 10317 9487 10754 
30 12827 4812 5944 8545 3007 6014 13771 14483 13490 14672 13009 
60 15044 15221 19052 14720 12126 12320 17055 13113 15019 16255 15834 
120 16217 16786 13438 12709 10468 4334 16564 15276 15582 15440 15214 
300 19170 9699 9729 9258 7018 5820 17791 18389 21260 18370 18108 
600 27327 17896 18412 6213 7058 4834 31127 26542 26533 27719 26438 
900 32286 26447 16254 10120 16200 9562 32332 36893 32264 38467 32305 
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